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ΠΕΡIΛΗΨΗ
Η επικράτηση θεσµικών εκτροπών υποδηλώνει 
την ύπαρξη οικονοµικής και κοινωνικής υπανά-
πτυξης, καθώς και αδυναµίες πολιτικής φύσε-
ως που είναι περισσότερο έκδηλες στα λιγότερο 
αναπτυγµένα κράτη. Χρησιµοποιώντας ένα πα-
γκόσµιο δείγµα αναπτυγµένων και αναπτυσσό-
µενων χωρών αποδεικνύεται ότι η σχέση µεταξύ 
διαφθοράς, που συνιστά µια σοβαρή θεσµική 
παρέκκλιση, και εισοδήµατος δεν είναι συµµετρι-
κή. Παρόλα αυτά, ο αποτελεσµατικός έλεγχος της 
διαφθοράς δε θα πρέπει να θεωρείται ως «οιονεί 
αγαθό πολυτελείας», η ζήτηση του οποίου αυξά-
νει όταν επιτευχθεί ένα συγκεκριµένο επίπεδο ει-
σοδήµατος. Αντίθετα, είναι εφικτός µέσα από την 
υιοθέτηση και την αποτελεσµατική εφαρµογή κα-
τάλληλων µακροχρόνιων πολιτικών και θεσµικών 
µεταρρυθµίσεων.
ΛΕΞΕΙΣ-ΚΛΕΙ∆ΙΑ: Οικονοµική ανάπτυξη, κοινω-
νική ανάπτυξη, ανταγωνιστικότητα, θεσµικό περι-
βάλλον, µεταρρυθµίσεις
ABSTRACT
The prevalence of institutional weaknesses 
largely unveils the existence of inherent eco-
nomic and social underdevelopment as well 
as persistent bottlenecks of political nature, 
which in principle are more intense in less 
developed countries. In this study, by using a 
global sample of developed and developing 
countries it is proved that the relationship 
between corruption, which is a serious insti-
tutional deficiency, and income is not a sym-
metric one. However, the effective control 
of corruption should not be considered as a 
“quasi luxury good” the demand of which 
increases once the level of income rises to 
a certain level. On the contrary, it may be 
achieved through the adoption and effective 
implementation of the appropriate long-run 
policies and institutional reforms.
KEY WORDS: Economic development, social 
development, competitiveness, institutional 
environment, reforms
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1. Introduction
C orruption is a global phenomenon that exists in all countries, not only developing but de-veloped as well (Myint, 2000). Corruption is an ancient problem (Bardhan, 1997), associated 
with all forms of human organization whereas historical data show that the efforts to combat 
corruption date back to its existence (Riley, 1998). The term “corruption” has been applied to 
such a wide variety of beliefs and practices that pinning down the concept proves to be difficult 
(United Nations Development Programme, 2008). As a result, there is no international consensus 
on the specific meaning of the term. Due to the complex nature of corruption neither exists an 
internationally agreed definition of the concept corresponding to all types and forms of the phe-
nomenon (Council of Europe, 1995).
The most widely accepted definition of corruption in the relevant literature has been com-
piled by the World Bank, according to which corruption is “the abuse of public office for private 
gain” (World Bank, 1997). Most existing definitions of corruption are variations of this prevalent 
definition. OECD (1996) defines public sector corruption as the misuse of public office, roles or 
resources for private benefit, material or otherwise. Lambsdorff (1999) adopts the common defi-
nition of corruption and specifies its meaning to the misuse of public power for private benefit. 
A definition provided by the nongovernmental organization Transparency International is the 
misuse of trusted power for own profit (Transparency International, 2011). 
Corruption can take up several facets, such as bribery, embezzlement, fraud, extortion and 
nepotism (Amundsen, 1999). It should be emphasized, however, that corruption is not always 
related to personal gain. More often than not, the beneficiaries are the so-called third parties, 
namely the families, friends or the political party to which the individual belongs (Tanzi, 1998). 
Also, it must be stressed that although corruption is observed at both the private and the public 
sector, the vast bulk of the economic literature examines only public sector corruption for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the phenomenon is mainly associated with the public sector and secondly, 
widely accepted private sector corruption indices have not yet been constructed, rendering the 
relevant empirical research extremely difficult (Rontos, Syrmali and Vavouras, 2013).
Corruption is associated with two basic features, namely public authority and morality. 
Specified as such, corruption is often characterized as a “disease” inherent to public power and 
an indication of bad governance (Tiihonen, 2003). Moreover, the general attitude towards cor-
ruption is also determined by the prevailing ethical standards and personal values; that is by the 
system of individual moral attributes existing in each country at a specific time. However it must 
be stressed that not all people facing the same socioeconomic environment are equally prone to 
corruption exhibiting identical opportunistic behavior. Having stressed this individualistic dimen-
sion of corruption, it should be emphasized that it is generally accepted that corruption is mainly 
considered as a social phenomenon depending less on the individual psychological or personality 
characteristics of people and more on the cultural, institutional and political basis on which the 
specific country is constructed (Sung, 2002), not ignoring of course and the level of its economic 
development. 
Major causes of underdevelopment are of domestic origin, shaped by internal to the specific 
country forces. Therefore, when economic and sociopolitical patterns of corruption prevail and 
become institutionalized their control is extremely difficult, whereas the political difficulties of 
reform become even more challenging (Bräutigam and Knack, 2004). As a result, the extent of 
corruption varies among countries because corruption operates in a certain cultural and political 
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context that influences its growth (Benson and Cullen, 1998), among other factors. Generally, 
the determinants of corruption could be distinguished between those that affect the motives 
or incentives of agents to engage in corruption and those that create opportunities for corrupt 
activities (Martinez-Vazquez, Arze del Granado and Boex, 2007).
As corruption is a multidimensional issue it has several causes (Lalountas, Manolas and 
Vavouras, 2011). The empirical analysis has established that the single most important factor 
affecting corruption is the level of economic development. In this context, corruption is consid-
ered to be both a cause as well as a consequence of poverty. The direction of causality between 
corruption and income per capita, as an approximation of the level of economic development, 
has already been under scrutiny in the relevant empirical literature. Paldam (2002) shows that 
corruption is a sub-product of poverty that gets restricted as economies develop and there is a 
transition from poverty to increased levels of economic development. In this manner, the direc-
tion of causality is mainly from income towards corruption. However, corruption control is not an 
automatic process that starts only when a certain income threshold is reached. On the contrary, it 
is achieved through the adoption and the effective implementation of the appropriate long-run 
policies (Rontos, Syrmali and Vavouras, 2015).
Moreover, it must be pointed out that corruption is extensive in low income countries, due 
to a series of structural weaknesses that prevail in them and are conducive to its expansion. 
Therefore, in low income economies corruption might prove to be a “survival strategy” (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999). In these countries many people live below subsistence level and often try to 
satisfy the means for their survival with illegitimate means (Shen and Williamson, 2005). There-
fore, the motive for the increase of personal income is indeed intense and is becoming more so 
due to widespread poverty and low public sector salaries (Gray and Kaufmann, 1998). As a result, 
in the aforementioned cases corruption invades society. In addition, it is often argued that cor-
ruption might be less detrimental in countries plagued with a very inefficient institutional frame-
work as it may act as the grease for the wheels of an economy in order to overcome bureaucratic 
rigidities and administrative delays that inhibit economic activity (Méon and Weil, 2010).
Furthermore, Lambsdorff (2007) claims that increased levels of corruption are closely re-
lated to the lack of competitiveness. Competitiveness addresses structural challenges in order 
to ensure more sustainable and inclusive growth. Ades and di Tella (1999) support the view that 
corruption is greater in countries where domestic enterprises are protected from international 
competition and are characterized by inherent market restrictions. However, the direction of the 
causal relationship is not clear. Bliss and di Tella (1997) argue that corruption may affect the level 
of competition. Emerson (2006) empirically proves that competition and corruption are related, 
whereas it is also argued that policies aiming at combating corruption may strengthen industrial 
competition in cases that it is set as a development goal.
Klitgaard (1998) argues that multiple and complex regulations may increase corruption lev-
els. According to Svensson (2005), government regulations that raise barriers to entry give public 
officials the power to demand and collect bribes. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have 
higher corruption levels and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or pri-
vate goods (Djankov et al., 2002). Treisman (2000) argues that corruption is higher in countries 
with greater state intervention in the economy in the form of regulations, among others.
It is also acknowledged that there exists a strong interconnection between corruption and 
the level of existing political freedoms. On the one side corruption affects the quality of democ-
racy and on the other the quality of democracy affects the level of corruption. Corruption is widely 
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considered to be both a symptom and a cause for the malfunctioning of democratic institu-
tions (Warren, 2004). Shleifer and Vishny (1993) support the view that the structure of political 
processes and, especially democracy, prove restrictive for the proliferation of corruption, mainly 
because of the competition they set as a precondition for the acquisition of political office, which 
in turn presupposes widespread democratic participation and increased levels of transparency. 
Moreover, democratic accountability raises the costs of corrupt behavior and as a result limits the 
opportunities presented for corruption (Bohara, Mitchell and Mittendorff, 2004). Kunicov (2006) 
supports the view that in less democratic countries there are more opportunities for developing 
rent-seeking behavior, which is closely linked to corruption. Goel and Nelson (2010) reach the 
conclusion that corruption is less prevalent in politically free countries, as defined by the level of 
political rights and the extent of civil liberties. 
Based on the preceding analysis, the current paper has two main objectives. The first ob-
jective is to examine the above-mentioned factors, namely the level of economic development, 
structural competitiveness, the quality of regulatory framework and the extent of political free-
doms, as the main causes of corruption in the world. The second objective is to analyze whether 
the relationship between income and corruption is uniform for all countries, independently of 
their level of economic development. Ignoring these variations as far as the effective control of 
corruption is concerned may lead to mistaken inferences regarding public policy, especially for 
developing countries, which are seriously affected by the phenomenon.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data available and the 
empirical methodology employed, whereas section 3 discusses the main results that emerge out 
of the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the conclusions and some major policy guidelines.
2. Methodology
A ll the variables, which are employed for the analysis, have been derived for a global sample of 139 countries. As far as time coverage is concerned, it must be pointed out that since 
the year 2005, the methodology of the competitiveness index underwent significant changes 
rendering intertemporal comparisons of the index extremely problematic. Therefore, the data 
used for the empirical estimation start after the year 2005. Moreover, the time period examined 
expands until the year 2014, which is the year with the most currently available data. Due to the 
aforementioned restrictions, the sample of countries is examined over the period 2005-2014.
The variables used have been extracted from official statistics and other well-known interna-
tional data sources. More specifically, to express corruption the corruption perceptions index (CPI) 
is employed provided by Transparency International (TI). The values of the indicator lie between 
0 to 100, where 0 denotes that a country is perceived as highly corrupt, whereas 100 means 
that a country is perceived as very clean. Structural competitiveness is expressed with the global 
competitiveness index produced by the World Economic Forum (WEF). The values of the indica-
tor range between 1-7, with higher values corresponding to increased levels of competitiveness. 
To approximate the level of economic development in each country, gross domestic product per 
capita in purchasing power parity is used transformed into a logarithmic scale [ln(GDP.pc.ppp)] in 
order to facilitate empirical estimates. This variable is derived from the World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The political determinants of corrup-
tion are approached in terms of the range of political rights index (PR) and the extent of civil lib-
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erties (CL), estimated by the Freedom House organization. The score scale of both indexes varies 
between 1 and 7, with lower values representing improved freedom standards. Countries with a 
combined average rating of 1-2.5 are considered “free”, 3-5 “partly free” and 5.5-7 “not free”. 
To measure the degree to which policies and institutions are supportive of economic freedom, a 
composite index referring to regulations on credit, labor and business (REG) is employed compiled 
by Fraser Institute. The measurement scale of the index lies between 0-10, where higher values of 
the index correspond to greater economic freedom.
Building on the precedent analysis about the main determinants of corruption, the basic 
model for estimation has the following form:
(1)
As far as the analysis of the current sample is concerned, it must be stressed that the 
repeated observations of enough cross-sections, the so-called panel analysis, permits to examine 
the dynamics of change with short time series (Yaffee, 2003). The combination of time series with 
cross-sections can enhance the quality and quantity of data in ways that would be impossible 
using only one of these two dimensions (Gujarati, 2003).
The employed panel data is estimated with the Fixed Effects (FE) method (applying the White 
diagonal correction of standard errors for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation). To decide on 
the estimation method a Hausman test was conducted (Baltagi, 2005), which indicated that the 
Fixed Effects (FE) method is preferred instead of the Random Effects (RE) method. The Fixed Ef-
fects (FE) method can be used with panel data to estimate the effect of time-varying independent 
variables in the presence of time-constant omitted variables (Wooldridge, 2013). Therefore, the 
unobserved heterogeneity could be treated by assuming that omitted variables do not change 
over time and as a result by eliminating their effect through the FE method. With regard to this 
empirical model, it might be assumed that omitted variables remain constant over time due to 
the small time dimension of the sample (T=8). To test the validity of the results the Panel Least 
Squares method (without fixed or random effects either for cross section or time series data) is 
also performed, which is presented in column (4) of table 3. To evaluate the robustness of the re-
sults, static cross section estimation is also carried out concerning the most recent available data, 
which refer to the year 2014, and are presented in table 4. 
3. Results
T able 1 reports summary statistics presenting some preliminary results. All countries, regardless their average real income levels, are included in the analysis. This is also evident by the large 
difference between the minimum and the maximum value of the used per capita income index 
(GDP.pc.ppp), which ranges between $389.312 and $102.724,238 respectively, expressed in its 
original values.  The corruption index (CPI) varies between 1.4 (highest corruption level) and 9.7 
(lowest corruption level). Moreover, no country in the world sample is totally free of corruption 
as expressed by the relevant CPI index, as the maximum theoretical value (10) of the corruption 
index is not reached by any country. 
( ) ( )

     
     	 
        	 
 = + + + + + + +    
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Mean Standard 
eviation
Min. Max.
CPI 4.363 2.147 1.400 9.700
GCI 4.173 0.684 2.577 5.646
ln(GDP.pc.ppp ) 9.028 1.198 5.965 11.541
PR 3.189 2.011 1.000 7.000
CL 3.019 1.637 1.000 7.000
REG 6.985 0.882 3.895 9.075
  Table 2 containing the correlation matrix provides a first approximation for the main 
determinants of corruption. Competitiveness as measured by the relevant GCI index has a strong 
positive correlation with corruption (CPI). Data show, on average, that countries with a high 
degree of competitiveness (GCI) exhibit lower levels of corruption (CPI). Moreover, countries with 
higher levels of GDP.pc.ppp show lower levels of corruption (CPI). An interesting finding, which 
is also reached by the ensuing regression results, is the negative correlation between corruption 
(CPI) and the political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) indexes, as higher values of these indicators 
correspond to lower actual levels of freedom. Moreover, the relation between corruption (CPI) 
and the political rights (PR) index in particular is not very strong (-0.538). In addition, political 
rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) are strongly related, whereas the sign of this relationship is 
positive due to the measurement scale of both indexes. 
Table 2. Correlation matrix
CPI GCI ln(GDP) PR CL REG
CPI 1
GCI 0.867 1
ln(GDP)  0.766 0.837 1
PR -0.538 -0.422 -0.451 1
CL -0.641 -0.499 -0.535 0.937 1
REG  0.572 0.558 0.434 -0.281 -0.347 1
Figure 1 presents the scatter plot between corruption as approached by the corruption 
perceptions index (CPI) and income as measured by gross domestic product per capita based 
on purchasing-power-parity transformed into a logarithmic scale [ln(GDP.pc.ppp)]. The scatter 
plot provides indications about the existence of non linear relationships between the variables 
of interest. For countries with low GDP per capita, as income increases the level of corruption 
increases as well until it reaches a certain level of income. When this income threshold is achieved 
the relationship between corruption and income becomes positive. Therefore, for countries with 
higher GDP per capita and as a result a higher level of economic development, an increase in the 
level of income is associated with a reduction in the level of perceived corruption.
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Figure 1. Scatter plot, 2005-2014
 
The results according to the Fixed Effects (FE) method are presented in table 3. Cross section 
estimates concerning the year 2014 are summarized in table 4. In the relevant tables, below coef-
ficient estimates, the standard error, the t-statistic and the p-value is given. Moreover, the results 
of the Hausman test conducted for the choice of the panel regression method appear in last 
row of Table 3 together with the corresponding p-value (in parenthesis). It must be stressed that 
results regarding the two estimation methods do not differ significantly as far as their economic 
and statistical significance is concerned. As a result, estimation results with the preferred Fixed 
Effects approach are analyzed in the following lines. 
According to the Fixed Effects (FE) estimates presented in column (3) of table 3, all independ-
ent variables are statistically significant and have the expected signs, with the exception of the 
political rights (PR) index, which is positive. However, the PR variable is not statistically significant 
at conventional significance levels. This result is also confirmed by a different specification of the 
basic model presented in column (1) of table 3. The above outcome concerning the PR variable 
may be due to the high correlation between the political rights (PR) and the civil liberties (CL) in-
dex. The civil liberties (CL) variable is statistically significant at the 1% level and negative, as higher 
values of this index correspond to lower levels of political freedom. The variable expressing the 
quality of the regulatory framework (REG) is positive and marginally significant at the 10% level. 
The estimated competitiveness coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level and retains its sign and statistical significance in all alternative specifications of the basic 
model presented in columns (1) and (2) of table 3. More specifically, a one-point increase in 
the competitiveness index increases the corruption index by 1.229 points and as a result the 
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perceived level of corruption is decreased according to the measurement scale of the corruption 
index. Based on the estimation results, if Greece (4.050) had the level of competitiveness of the 
United States (5.646), which is the best performer in the world sample regarding the competi-
tiveness index for the period under consideration, then the level of corruption in Greece (4.036) 
would improve and approximate that of Israel (6.038). 
Table 3. Fixed Effects (FE) and Panel Least Squares (PLS) estimates, 2005-2014
FE
(1)
FE
(2)
FE
(3)
PLS
(4)
Intercept -2.125***
0.378
-5.622
0.000
-2.011***
0.467
-4.306
0.000
18.681***
1.735
10.767
0.000
21.648***
1.868
11.586
0.000
GCI 1.175***
0.081
14.416
0.000
1.165***
0.081
14.230
0.000
1.229***
0.079
15.509
0.000
1.620***
0.093
17.419
0.000
ln(GDP.pc.ppp) 0.078*
0.042
1.848
0.065
0.071*
0.042
1.687
0.092
-0.907**
0.353
-2.300
0.021
-5.523***
0.413
-13.373
0.000
REG 0.052*
0.031
1.653
0.098
   0.078**
0.034
2.239
0.025
0.082*
0.046
1.772
0.077
0.265***
0.043
6.163
0.000
PR 0.004
0.363
0.011
0.992
0.004
0.065
0.060
0.952
0.028
0.019
1.474
0.141
CL -0.099***
0.035
-2.813
0.005
-0.256***
0.037
-6.919
0.000
-0.091***
0.033
-2.794
0.005
-0.399***
0.062
-6.435
0.000
[ln(GDP.pc.ppp)]2 0.060***
0.021
2.934
0.004
0.368***
0.029
12.689
0.000
R2 0.986 0.985 0.986 0.859
F-statistic 360.443 358.749 358.530 709.401
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hausman 120.709
(0.000)
136.785
(0.000)
196.842
(0.000)
196.842
(0.000)
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4. OLS estimates, 2014
OLS
(1)
OLS
(2)
OLS
(3)
Intercept
-5.139***
0.397
-12.945
0.000
-6.341**
0.455
-13.936
0.000
19.571***
2.103
9.306
0.000
GCI
2.019***
0.104
19.503
0.000
2.028***
0.103
19.603
0.000
1.712***
0.097
17.649
0.000
ln(GDP)
0.123**
0.060
2.067
0.039
0.126**
0.060
2.108
0.035
-6.123***
0.413
-14.830
0.000
REG 0.246***
0.042
5.857
0.000
0.352***
0.051
6.902
0.000
0.284***
0.052
5.462
0.000
PR
-0.083*
0.054
-1.578
0.115
  0.085
0.054
1.563
0.119
CL
-0.491***
0.075
-6.547
0.000
-0.434***
0.038
-11.421
0.000
-0.442***
0.073
-6.054
0.000
[ln(GDP.pc.ppp)]2
0.369***
0.029
12.689
0.000
R2 0.811 0.811 0.859
F-statistic 603.665 752.412 709.401
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
After replacing coefficients with their Fixed Effects (FE) estimates, equation (1) takes the 
following form:
(2)
( ) ( )

 	
     	   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Since,  

	
 
 
  and   

	
 
 
  ,
the relationship between income and corruption is u-shaped. In order to find the turning 
point of income, the partial effect of income on corruption is computed as follows: 

	
 
 
  = 0 ð -0.907 + 2 · 0,060ln(GDP.pc.ppp) = 0 ð -0,907 + 0.120ln(GDP.
pc.ppp) = 0 ð ln(GDP.pc.ppp) =                 ð ln(GDP.pc.ppp) = 7.558 ð GDP.pc.ppp = e7.558 ð 
GDP.pc.ppp = 2.7187.558 ð GDP.pc.ppp = 1.914,509
Therefore, it is estimated that countries with GDP per capita lower than $1.914,509 do not 
reach the income threshold. In these countries, an increase in the level of income is associated 
with an increase in the level of corruption. Countries that do not attain the required income 
level for the period 2005-2014, are presented in table 5. Due to the sufficiently large number 
of countries “trapped” in this category, the decreasing part of the above quadratic relationship 
cannot be ignored. Countries belonging to this group may be classified as “least developed 
countries” and “landlocked developing countries”, according to the United Nations classification, 
because of the poor living conditions prevailing in them. 
Table 5. Countries that do not reach the income threshold
Least developed countries Burundi, Malawi, Madagascar, Tanzania (United Republic of 
Tanzania), Mali, Mozambique, Rwanda, Zambia, Burkina Faso, 
Benin, Haiti, Yemen, Bangladesh, Senegal, Gambia
Landlocked developing countries Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Chad, Tajikistan
Note: (1) The categorization between “least developed countries” and “landlocked developing countries” 
is based on the United Nations classification. See, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm. 
(2) Countries are presented in increasing income order, as expressed by GDP.pc.ppp.
(3) Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria do not reach the income threshold as well but are not included under either 
“Least developed” or “Landlocked developing” countries, according to the United Nations categorization.
6.Conclusion 
T
he prevalence of corruption largely unveils the existence of economic and social underdevel-
opment as well as institutional rigidities and political incapacity, which are more intense in 
less developed countries. As a result, policies implemented to tackle corruption are meaningless 
without understanding the underlying determinants of the phenomenon. The omission from the 
analysis of the appropriate determinant factors is recognized as one of the principal obstacles in 
building and establishing effective and sustainable anti-corruption systems. This paper makes a 
0.907
0,120
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systematic attempt to analyze the determinant factors of corruption and to test the linearity as-
sumption concerning the relationship between corruption and income. More specifically, the en-
hancement of competitiveness is linked to improved infrastructure, institutions, macroeconomic 
performance and social services, among others. These pillars constitute the principal transmission 
channels through which competitiveness affects corruption. 
By using a global sample of developed and developing countries it is proved in this study 
that the relationship between corruption and income is not symmetric as one might expect. In 
high income countries, economic development is definitely linked to a decline in perceived cor-
ruption levels. On the contrary, in low income economies an increase in the level of per capita 
income, as expressed by gross domestic product per capita in purchasing power parity, seems to 
be linked to an increase in the level of corruption. This result comes as no surprise as in these 
countries corruption has penetrated into the value system of society at large and is often consid-
ered by socially excluded people who are affected by poverty as an essential mechanism for their 
survival. Moreover, in low income countries, corruption is to some extent a “survival strategy”. 
In these countries, increasing personal income is a strong motive and is becoming stronger due 
to conditions of utter deprivation and low public sector salaries. In order to survive and support 
their families, low paid public sector employees may take small bribes, especially when their jobs 
are associated with high degree of uncertainty, mainly due to political instability, that reduces 
the probability of future wages appropriation. According to this line of thought, corruption is a 
“disease” caused by poverty, or a by-product of poverty that only diminishes when economies 
develop. 
However, the effective control of corruption should not be considered as an automatic pro-
cess that starts only when countries reach a certain income threshold. On the contrary, it may be 
achieved through the adoption and effective implementation of the appropriate long-run policies 
and institutional reforms. Based on the above analysis, it must be stressed that anti-corruption 
strategies should not be applied uniformly to countries as ignoring the aforementioned diver-
gences may lead to fallacious inferences regarding the fight against corruption. In underdevel-
oped countries corruption has systemic character and deep roots and constitutes part of everyday 
practice. In cases where the phenomenon becomes institutionalized, the control of corruption 
is extremely difficult. Therefore, without ignoring the economic dimension, the broader social 
and political context should also be taken into account in order to effectively combat corruption. 
The extent of political freedoms represented mainly by civil liberties, seems to be another 
critical factor that affects the level of corruption globally. The higher the index of civil liberties, 
corresponding to reduced levels of political freedom, the higher are the risks for politically moti-
vated violence and destabilization. It could therefore be argued that achieving and maintaining 
improved corruption standards is facilitated by the smooth functioning of democratic political 
institutions and civil liberties. Notions such as freedom of expression and belief, the protection 
of associational and organizational rights, the promotion of the rule of law and the defense of 
personal autonomy and individual rights constitute but a few of the principal elements for the 
operation of a politically free state. Nevertheless, the long-run health of the political system 
often requires internal checks and balances, whereas openness and transparency are the best 
ways of ensuring that such structural mechanisms develop. Moreover, from the empirical analysis 
emerges that economic freedom and deregulation may reduce the scope of corruption.
 In practical terms, the analysis implies that implementing universal policy recommenda-
tions to all countries indiscriminately, regardless of their economic, social and political back-
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ground proves to be ineffective and unresponsive. To put it differently, in case that corruption is 
endemic, deeply embedded in the political and social dynamics of a country, the corresponding 
initiatives taken to reduce corruption should be responsive to individual sociopolitical traits of 
countries, whereas they should also be supported by a deliberate policy mix, targeted reforms 
and structural adjustments. These long-run factors are important under the sustainability spec-
trum. The inefficiency of anti-corruption policies in low income countries may be explained by 
their short sighted character as they do not take into account the necessary social and political 
transformation.
The above analysis has highlighted that achieving and mainly maintaining anti-corruption 
reforms is a challenging task as it is associated with a wide variety of economic as well as noneco-
nomic factors of social and political nature. From a sustainable perspective, these requirements 
are mainly achieved through the establishment of profound social and political transformation. 
The more unitary, concrete and stable the country is, the harder it becomes for phenomena 
that can paralyze state structure to prosper. Likewise, countries characterized by low levels of 
economic development, reduced social capital, weak social cohesion and fluid environments in 
the allocation of political power, are those countries in which corruption finds fertile ground to 
infiltrate and materialize. Therefore, anti-corruption challenges are even greater in developing 
countries as not only the most relevant rules have to be prescribed but these policies have also 
to be supported by appropriate governance structures in order to enforce them, which in poor 
countries are inherently weak. Moreover, concerns of improved social capabilities along with in-
tensified efforts targeting economic development should be fully incorporated into future policy 
purposes and strategies as effective guides for remedying the root causes of institutional failures, 
such as corruption.
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Appendix
Table A1. Countries included in the sample
Albania Dominican Republic Lebanon Rwanda
Algeria Ecuador Lesotho Saudi Arabia
Angola Egypt Lithuania Senegal
Argentina El Salvador Luxembourg Serbia
Armenia Estonia Madagascar Singapore
Australia Ethiopia Malawi Slovakia
Austria Finland Malaysia Slovenia
Azerbaijan France Mali South Africa
Bahrain Gambia Malta Spain
Bangladesh Georgia Mauritania Sri Lanka
Barbados Germany Mauritius Suriname
Belgium Ghana Mexico Swaziland
Benin Greece Moldova Sweden
Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia Switzerland
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guyana Montenegro Syria
Botswana Haiti Morocco Tajikistan
Brazil Honduras Mozambique Tanzania
Brunei Hong Kong Namibia Thailand
Bulgaria Hungary Nepal The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia
Burkina Faso Iceland Netherlands Timor-Leste
Burundi India New Zealand Trinidad and Tobago
Cambodia Indonesia Nicaragua Tunisia
Cameroon Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran) Nigeria Turkey
Canada Ireland Norway Uganda
Cape Verde Israel Oman Ukraine
Chad Italy Pakistan United Arab Emirates
Chile Jamaica Panama United Kingdom
China Japan Paraguay United States
Colombia Jordan Peru Uruguay
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Philippines Venezuela
Côte d’Ivoire Kenya Poland Vietnam
Croatia Korea (South) Portugal Yemen
Cyprus Kuwait Qatar Zambia
Czech Republic Kyrgyzstan Romania Zimbabwe
Denmark Latvia Russia
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Notes
1. http://www.weforum.org.
2. In this paper, the terms competition and competitiveness are not used alternatively. However, 
there is a strong interconnection between these two terms, as it is broadly accepted that 
competition between firms is associated with the level of a country’s competitiveness, which 
defines at a great extent the ability of enterprises to compete in the domestic or international 
market. See, http://www.imd.org/wcc/research-methodology/.
3. The list of countries included in the sample is presented in Table A1 of the Appendix.
4. Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index was first launched in 1995 and is 
published on an annual basis since then. As far as the time period examined, which covers the 
years 2005-2014, it must be pointed out that until the year 2011, the measurement scale of 
the corruption index ranges between 0-10. In the year 2012, it changed to the 0-100 score 
scale. Therefore, in order to facilitate intertemporal comparison of the index, the values of the 
indicator for the years 2012-2014 have been transformed into the 0-10 scale by dividing its 
values with 10. See, http://www.transparency.org.
5. See, http://www.weforum.org/
6. See, www.imf.org.
7. See, www.freedomhouse.org.
8. http://www.fraserinstitute.org.
9. To estimate the lower value of GDP, ln(GDP.pc.ppp) = 5.965 ð GDP = e5.965 ð GDP = 2.7185.965 
= 389.312 . To estimate the higher value of GDP, ln(GDP.pc.ppp) = 11.541 ð GDP = e11.541 ð 
GDP = 2.71811.541 =102.724,238.
10. Due to the fact that the political rights (PR) variable is not statistically significant, a differ-
ent specification of the baseline model is presented in column (2) of table 3 that does not 
include the PR index. Moreover, in column (1) of table 3 the quadratic term of income [ln(GDP.
pc.ppp)]2 is excluded from the basic model so as to test the robustness of empirical findings 
in the presence of different control variables. It must be pointed out that in all specifications 
tested all explanatory variables retain their signs and statistical significance.
11. According to the correlation table (table 2), the correlation coefficient between the political 
rights (PR) and the civil liberties (CL) index is 0.937.
12. See, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm.
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